

# Special Warfare

A full-page photograph of a sniper in a ghillie suit, camouflaged with dry grass and green leaves, lying in tall grass. A rifle is visible in the lower left corner. The title 'Special Warfare' is at the top, with a red line and a bullet graphic passing through it.

MAY-JUNE 2008  
VOLUME 21 ISSUE 3

## SHOOTERS AND THINKERS

SPECIAL FORCES SNIPER COURSE REVISED



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
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A Special Forces sniper observes a target prior to maneuvering into a final firing position during training at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Special Forces Sniper Course.

Photo by K. Kassens.



# Special Warfare

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Manuscripts should be submitted in plain text, double-spaced, and in a digital file. End notes should accompany works in lieu of embedded footnotes. Please consult *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th Edition, for footnote style.

Submit graphics, tables and charts with source references in separate files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics). *Special Warfare* may accept high-resolution (300 dpi or greater) digital photos; be sure to include a caption and photographer's credit. Prints and 35 mm transparencies are also acceptable. Photos will be returned, if possible.

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Recently the JFK Special Warfare Center and School and the U.S. Army Special Forces Command co-hosted the Special Forces Symposium to bring together key Special Forces leaders and others with insight into conflict and national security. Addressing two main themes — the challenges of constant conflict and the art of Special Forces warfare — the symposium gave participants a chance to discuss operations, pass along lessons learned and discuss the future.

The commander of the U.S. Army Special Forces command, Major General Thomas Csrnko, described the successes of Special Forces Soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq and the growing appreciation among conventional commanders that an SF detachment can often accomplish more than a conventional battalion by getting out among the populace. Conventional commanders are also learning, he said, that SF do more than direct action and are the ideal force to train and advise partner-nation forces.

The current high operations tempo demanded by SF's worldwide missions causes frequent deployments that can affect retention, and Major General Csrnko outlined the SF Command's plans for helping SF Soldiers remain in the Army.

Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities Michael Vickers also spoke of the importance of retention. He told symposium participants that the war on terror will be won by a global campaign in which indirect operations and intelligence will have primacy, and in which SF will play a central part.

Noted author and retired Army officer Ralph Peters forecasted a future of conflict and challenges. He theorizes that societies are moving away from unification based on ideology and national identity and are returning to conflicts based on religion and ethnicity — loyalties that are difficult or impossible to change. He predicts that Third World boundaries established by Europeans without regard to culture will collapse, resulting in overwhelming instability.


The symposium also gave us at the schoolhouse the chance to educate attendees on the extent of the changes and improvements that we have made to ARSOF training over the last few years. Probably the most dramatic of those may be the changes we have made in the way we teach the Special Forces Qualification Course. Four years ago, the SFQC was 63 weeks long and ran four classes per year. Today, it is 49 weeks long, includes greater training time in culture, language, marksmanship and combatives, and runs eight classes per year. Furthermore, the new course raises standards, reduces attrition, requires the same number of instructors and saves an estimated \$12 million annually.

As future operations focus less on Afghanistan and Iraq and more on other parts of the world, we will need to continue to adapt our training to incorporate new scenarios and lessons learned. As operations take on a more indirect approach, our Soldiers' ability to work through partner-nations' forces will become even more important, and our planning will have to place a greater emphasis on human intelligence.

The Special Forces Symposium brought together people from the media, our civilian DoD leadership, currently serving Special Forces commanders and command sergeants major, and former Special Forces general officers. It was a great opportunity to share experiences with each other and, more importantly, to check the azimuth we are on and question whether we are headed in the right direction to meet the nation's future requirements for Special Forces.

I left the symposium confident that Special Forces is better trained, equipped and manned than ever before in our history and that we are indeed on the right "course" to ensure that Special Forces continues to be the nation's premiere unconventional-warfare force, with the flexibility and adaptability to meet the needs of combatant commanders around the world — now and in the future.



  
Major General James W. Parker



## Symposium tackles 'art of war' and 'constant conflict'

"The Art of Special Forces Warfare" and the "challenges of persistent conflict" were key themes addressed by Special Forces leaders during the Special Forces Symposium, April 7-9 at Fort Bragg, N.C.

Co-sponsored by the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School and the SF Command, the symposium brought key SF leaders together to discuss ongoing operations, share lessons learned and look to the future of a force that is engaged in constant warfare.

In addition to briefings from current leaders, a "gray beard" panel of retired SF Soldiers pointed out lessons learned from past operations that can be used in current and future operations. Participating in the panel were: Major General Eldon Bargewell, Major General Harley C. Davis, Brigadier General Richard Mills, Brigadier General Joseph Stringham and Colonel Mark Boyatt.

The SWCS commanding general, Major General James W. Parker, spoke on the transformation of the Special Forces training pipeline. Major General Parker has undertaken the most sweeping changes ever in the SF training pipeline during his tenure at the schoolhouse. Changes in the training pipeline have shortened the length of the training while maintaining the same high standards.

Major General Thomas Csrnko, commander, U.S. Army Special Forces Command, outlined a new retention plan aimed at keeping SF Soldiers in the Army. The plan is particularly important at a time when optempo is causing frequent, long deployments that put a strain not only on the Soldier but on his Family, as well.

The plan includes a movie filmed by Frank Capra Jr., called *Why We Fight Now*. Csrnko said the movie is important because it will help people "understand" the role of SF in the war on terror.

"It is our opportunity to tell our story,"



▲ **WAR ZONE** Major Jeremie Oates, company commander, Company D, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, briefs Michael Vickers, assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low intensity conflict and interdependent capabilities, on the fictional country of Pineland, which is used in the culmination exercise for the Special Forces Qualification Course, known as Robin Sage. Photo by Sergeant Curtis Squires, SWCS PAO.

said Csrnko.

The second element of the plan is focused on retention. Sergeant Major Timothy Wallace, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command retention NCO, unveiled a new theme designed to "get to the root of why Soldiers stay." "For those on my left and my right" targets the brotherhood of SF Soldiers. A second campaign is designed to keep Soldiers SF for life and is aimed at honoring the service of SF veterans.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities Michael Vickers addressed three key issues to the SOF leaders: the war on terror will be won by achieving a steady state, with the U.S. carrying out operations in scores of countries where we are not at war; the war on terror necessitates an indirect/ clandestine approach, where intelligence has primacy; and the transformation of the SF headquarters into fighting organizations.

He also commended the regiment

on its growth, in particular the work of SWCS in increasing the output of SF Soldiers. He added that much still has to be done in the area of incentives and grade structure to keep experience in the force.

Dr. Thomas Barnett, a strategic planner who has worked in national-security affairs since the end of the Cold War, shared his insights on global conflict and military transformation, international security and economic globalization. He said that globalization is the "ultimate reformatting process." Barnett divides the world into the core and the gap, or in his words, "those who have it" and "those who don't." He said that 95 percent of all terrorism exists in the gap, and he calls it the expeditionary theater of the 21st century.

Ralph Peters, a noted author and columnist, shared his insights into global conflict and why it is being waged. He urged the Soldiers to look at conflicts with a historical perspective, noting that for conflict to be truly understood, it must be thought of in terms of "millenniums."

# 98th Civil Affairs Battalion Activated

On Friday, March 14, Lieutenant Colonel Ray Malave took command of the newest active-duty Civil Affairs battalion, the 98th CA Battalion, during an activation ceremony at Bull Simons Plaza, Fort Bragg, N.C. The 98th is part of the Army's only active-duty CA brigade, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade.

Malave greeted his troops in Spanish, the native tongue of the Latin American countries his battalion will support.

"Although today marks the activation of this fine organization, it does not start today," said Malave. "The history book for the 98th Civil Affairs Battalion, the 'Bridge-Between Battalion', has a few pages already written."

Soldiers from the 98th CA Battalion are already participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom and operations in Africa. Malave explained that other 98th Soldiers will deploy in support of the Global War on Terrorism later in the year.

Colonel Ferdinand Irizarry, the 95th CA Brigade commander, said he was humbled by the courage and daily sacrifices made by his Soldiers and their families.

"Make no mistake about it, there are no greater ambassadors of our capability than the fine Soldiers standing before us and those serving in the field today," said Irizarry.

Irizarry acknowledged the contributions of Soldiers of the brigade's 96th CA Battalion, and how their storied history made the day possible.

"I would be remiss if I didn't acknowledge that this day was made possible by the two decades of achievements by the Soldiers of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion," said Irizarry. "Their accomplishments made expansion of an active component an irrefutable argument."



**^ IN ACTION** Lieutenant Colonel Ray Malave, (second from right) commander of the newly activated 98th Civil Affairs Battalion, hands the colors to Command Sergeant Major William C. Wright as part of the 98th's activation ceremony. *U.S. Army photo.*

The 98th CA Battalion is the only active-duty CA component available to the United States Southern Command.

Malave reminded his troops and guests that even though the focus of the war on terror is in the U.S. Central Command area of operations, they must not lose sight of events in their own backyard.

"This war has no territorial boundaries, and regionally aligned units are now operating globally," said Malave.

Malave said Latin America presents significant challenges from

unbalanced income, poverty, increasing crime rates and its status as the supplier of the majority of the world's cocaine.

"The Soldiers of the 98th Civil Affairs Battalion stand ready to face these challenges and those emerging around the world, as well," said Malave.

As the Army Special Operations Command continues its growth and reorganization, the 91st CA Battalion went into carrier status on March 14, with activation scheduled in a year.



## SWCS To Implement Military Language Mentor Program

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, is implementing a new program designed to better prepare its students for foreign-language training and to improve their performance once language training begins.

The SWCS ARSOF Language Program has begun assigning military language instructor, or MLI, mentors to students studying each of the 10 core languages in the Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations qualification courses. The support of the mentors is expected to help the language-instruction program produce a better-trained, more language-proficient Army special-operations forces operator.

MLI mentors are screened and hand-selected, then take three weeks of pre-service training before being assigned to a language class. The first MLI mentor, a 2/2+ DLPT 5-certified Spanish speaker, was assigned in January to help Soldiers who recently completed Special Forces Assessment and Selection, or SFAS, in Spanish. A second MLI mentor, a 2/2+ DLPT 5-certified Russian speaker, completed pre-service training in April and has begun mentoring students in the SF, CA and PSYOP pipelines in Russian.

Until now, SWCS has prepared SF, CA and PSYOP candidates for foreign language training by giving them instructional materials, a briefing on the importance of language and culture, a brief introduction to the materials, and an introductory meeting with an instructor in their target language. Experience and anecdotal information gathered from surveys indicate that following the briefing and introductions, many students still do not have a practical understanding of how to use the issued materials effectively.

To address that problem, and to prepare students for the challenges of a new generation of foreign-language tests, SWCS developed the concept of assigning mentors to perform the following duties:

- Assist SF, CA and PSYOP selectees with their foreign-language orientation and place emphasis on the importance to Soldiers in ARSOF of culture and foreign-language proficiency.
- Provide foreign-language mentoring, assistance and continuity in target language training for Soldiers selected through SFAS. E-mail contact will be continuous from the time



of selection until Soldiers return to Fort Bragg to begin the SF Qualification Course.

- Serve as the military role model, platoon sergeant and primary point of contact for ARSOF Soldiers who are training in their target language.
- Provide academic and motivational counseling to Soldiers.
- Monitor the effectiveness of classroom training and recommend improvements.
- Serve as an adjunct to the contract instructor in identifying challenges to learning and helping resolve them through individual tutoring and group instruction.
- Assist instructors with military terminology (in the target language and in English), lesson preparation and planning.
- Become a valuable part of the military-civilian contractor instructional team.

SWCS is seeking Soldiers who

want to volunteer to serve as language mentors. Qualifications are:

- Be a member of CMF 18, 38 or 37.
- Have and maintain at least a 2/2/2 proficiency in a foreign language, as measured by the Defense Language Proficiency Test. The goal will be to attain 3/3/3.
- Be eligible for an assignment of at least one year in order to provide for continuity and stability in assigned languages.

Training or familiarity in the following areas is also highly desirable:

- Training equivalent to the instructor-certification course taught by the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center.
- Introduction to foreign-language learning styles and strategies.
- Effective study habits.
- Test-taking strategies and anxiety reduction.
- Academic counseling techniques.
- Organization and time-management.
- Rapid Rote and the CL-150 matrix software-training package.
- Basic English refresher training.
- Rosetta Stone language training.
- The Special Operations Language Training Program.

Training for MLI mentors will be provided through the Training Development Division of the SWCS Directorate of Training and Doctrine, the Army Center for Enhanced Performance and the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center. Mentors will be able to accomplish their training locally.

MLI mentors will be assigned to Company C, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, SWCS, but they will work closely with training specialists in the Training Development Division and with other academic specialists. For additional information, telephone Mike Judge at DSN 239-2536, commercial (910) 432-2536, or send e-mail to: [judgem@soc.mil](mailto:judgem@soc.mil).

# BUILDING NATION BUILDERS:

## REVAMPING THE RESERVE CA PIPELINE



^ **AT THE SURF** Civil Affairs Soldiers receive realistic training at the Soldiers Urban Reaction Facility, or SURF, at Camp Mackall during the CULEX. U.S. Army photo.

by Janice Burton

As the Army refocuses the way it fights by putting a stronger emphasis on stability operations, the role of Civil Affairs will continue to grow. And with only one active Army Civil Affairs brigade, the role of U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs units will become even more important. With that in mind, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the proponent of Civil Affairs, has reshaped the training pipeline for Civil Affairs officers in both the active Army and the U.S. Army Reserve.

Of particular note is the transformation of the U.S. Army Reserve training pipeline. In 2005, the school did away with the “box of books”

training that had traditionally composed the reserve CA training. Reserve officers did the majority of their training via correspondence course and came to Fort Bragg only briefly to complete their training.

At that time, the course was modified, and all CA officers, both active and reserve, were enrolled in a nine-week course at Fort Bragg that aligned the training and ensured that all CA officers entering the field had the same level of training.


Because of the continued high optempo of the force, coupled with the time spent on active duty by the reserve force, the SWCS commander, Major General James Parker, directed

the staff to take a second look at the training in order to make it as efficient as possible, while giving reserve officers more time at home station. The caveat was that the level of training could not change, and the quality would remain world-class.

By harnessing technology, training developers were able to divide the nine-week course into four distinct phases, with two of those phases being conducted through distributed learning, or DL. The new structure shortens the Soldier’s time away from home to five weeks, for training conducted in-residence at Fort Bragg.

The new Civil Affairs Qualification (USAR CA Officer) Course consists of





four phases that must be conducted consecutively, and the completion of each phase is required before students start the next phase.

## Phase I

Phase I is an online DL course designed to give qualifying officers an introduction to Civil Affairs. Students are given up to three-months to complete the course. The course will provide information on basic branch skills, knowledge and abilities. Phase I also provides an in-depth look at the common components of culture.

This phase of training consists of three modules:

- Introduction to CA, which includes training about CA history; civil-military operations; units and teams; staff structure; and full-spectrum operations, including uncon-

ventional warfare, foreign internal defense and counterinsurgency operations.

- Military knowledge, which includes training on Army and joint command and staff, military briefings and interpreters.

- Cultural education, consisting of training on culture and religion.

Students participating in Phase I will utilize the Internet to log into SW-CS's e-learning site, BlackBoard, to fulfill the requirements of this phase.

## Phase II

Phase II is a two-week resident course at Fort Bragg that teaches core CA responsibilities necessary for conducting CA operations as a CA team leader. This phase is also taught in three modules:

- Civil Affairs core tasks — in-

cludes training on civil information management, support to civil administration, nation assistance and foreign humanitarian assistance.

- Civil Affairs operations — includes training on the civil-military operations center, other organizations, force protection and transition operations.

- Program management — includes training on project and resource management, funding procedures and vetting.

## Phase III

Phase III is also conducted through ARSOFU via BlackBoard. Students are given up to eight months to complete this phase. This phase includes the study of the military decision-making process, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, CA area



▲ **DOWN SOUTH** Civil Affairs Soldiers conduct medical civic-action programs in South America. *Photo copyright Steve Herbert.*

studies and assessments, and the Adaptive Thinking and Leadership Course. The phase is also divided into three modules:

- Research and analysis — includes training on civil systems and political-military analysis.
- Civil Affairs operations planning — includes training on decision making, Civil Affairs assessments, legal and moral responsibilities, and the Civil-military operations annex and estimate.
- Adaptive thinking and leadership — includes training on negotiation, mediation and adaptability.

## Phase IV

Phase IV, the final phase, is conducted in residence at Fort Bragg and is three weeks in length. Two of those weeks require students to participate in a field-training culmination exercise.

The exercise, known as Operation Certain Trust, tests the students' ability to apply their skills and knowledge in practical situations. Soldiers will be faced with the need to adapt while communicating, negotiating and resolving issues.

Conducted at Camp Mackall, N.C., Operation Certain Trust puts CA teams (officers and NCOs) in real-world situations with the help of cultural and military role players.

The teams will conduct tactical and CA operations utilizing Freedom Village, the Soldier's Urban Reaction Facility, and by interacting with key personnel in the surrounding communities. The exercise has been likened to Robin Sage, the culmination exercise for the Special Forces Qualification Course.

The beginning dates of the active Army and the U.S. Army Reserve CA officer courses are scheduled to allow for the two groups of students to be integrated during the Phase IV culmination exercise of the course, resulting in "seamless" training.

USAR officers (promotable first lieutenants to captains) wishing to enroll must be on orders or assigned to a CA unit. Units will use Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) to reserve seats in the course, and SWCS's Directorate of Special Operations Proponency will validate each applicant to ensure that they meet all course prerequisites. **SW**





# TEAM ENABLER:

## SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

By Captain David J. Smith and First Lieutenant Jeffrey Ritter

The current operational environment in Iraq is more dynamic than ever, as United States forces work to transition lines of operation, such as security and governance, to the government of Iraq. Battalion- and brigade-sized organizations are challenged by the number of tasks associated with providing security to the populace, supporting effective government systems that work within the structure of the Iraqi government, providing or improving essential services, creating enduring employment and bolstering the local economy.

Combining attachments such as Civil Affairs teams, or CATs; tactical PSYOP teams, or TPTs; and human-intelligence collection teams, or HCTs, into a cohesive maneuver element that is under the command and control of the battalion allows units to solve problems across all lines of operation. During Operation Iraqi Freedom V, the 3rd Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, a component of the 3rd

Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, formed an element called Team Enabler that combined all those capabilities. The 3-1 Cav employed Team Enabler during full-spectrum operations in the Mada'in Qada (a region southeast of Baghdad).

Creating an element like Team Enabler allows companies, troops and platoons to focus on security and on the critical tasks of securing the population from extremist elements and preventing sectarian violence. Team Enabler supplemented traditional combat forces by providing a venue for building trust and establishing relationships with local civil and tribal leaders. It built trust and relationships in two ways: by working in conjunction with the maneuver commander to engage local leaders and key players — the spheres of influence, or SOIs — and by making efforts to improve both the organization and the services of the local government. Within a few months of implementing the



▲ **STREET BEAT** Psychological Operations Soldiers move throughout an Iraqi village talking to members of the populace about their needs and problems. By combining the efforts of the PSYOP, Civil Affairs and intel teams, the command gets ground truth. *U.S. Army photo.*

Team Enabler concept, 3-1 Cav saw a noticeable increase in trust between the coalition forces, or CF, and the Iraqi population.

Building or improving Iraqi government institutions is critical to the success of the U.S. mission in Iraq. The Team Enabler organization allows units not only to conduct SOI engagements but also to devote the time necessary to building and improving government structure and efficiency. CATs are experts in assisting civil leaders to make community improvements using existing government structures and in promoting efficiency in the execution of the tasks of basic governance. CATs also provide channels for coordination between brigade-level partners at the regional level and the Iraqi provincial reconstruction teams that coordinate efforts with the Iraqi provincial and national government. CAT support allows maneuver commanders to focus on establishing security and keeping pressure on extremist elements who may try to dis-

rupt the efforts of CF and the Iraqi government.

Team Enabler was also successful in developing a quick-win project plan along Butler Range Road, a key line of communication that connected the entire brigade combat team with its logistics support from division and corps. By drilling artesian wells and negotiating local contracts for water delivery, Team Enabler helped bring a significant improvement in the quantity and quality of drinking water for several nearby villages. The rapid and visible improvement in essential services created a closer relationship with local leaders and citizens that greatly improved the security environment along Butler Range Road.

TPTs are able to conduct aggressive information operations that are focused on building support for local government institutions and agendas as they begin the process of “winning the hearts and minds” by reducing popular support for extremist elements.



By working closely with local leaders, HCT teams were able to provide units with information that allowed them to accurately target high-value individuals. During a number of operations, Team Enabler's HCT team was able to develop sources of significant intelligence on the 3/1st Cav's targets. That information was used to kill or capture extremist leaders and greatly reduced the security threat to coalition forces and local citizens. The reduced security threat encouraged locals to open up to Team Enabler and the HCT and provide additional information. Tailgate medical operations and larger medical civic-action programs, involving Iraqi doctors and medicines provided by the Iraqi ministry of health, were particularly effective. Along with the distribution of water and school supplies, these operations provided opportunities for the HCT to engage citizens in a secure environment without endangering either themselves or their sources.

Team Enabler had the ability to provide essential services, create enduring employment and build the local economy. CATs, by developing and prioritizing projects, identify what is needed to achieve the effects desired by the unit and the local government. CATs have individuals trained to provide the right amount of knowledge, time and energy to properly develop near- and long-term economic plans within the area of operations. That allows a single entity to focus on achieving "visible improvement" throughout the area of operations, or AO.

TPTs are able to identify the concerns and attitudes of the populace that help determine problem areas in which projects may be necessary to deny extremists sanctuary and safe haven. They are also able to determine whether a unit is achieving its desired effects on a population over time.

HCT teams are able to obtain information on extremists in an area through nonthreatening means. We found that information was sometimes easier collected by a Team Enabler organization using the "carrot" instead of the "stick."

Team Enabler was more successful at making connections with local citizens than combat-oriented forces were. In one instance, Team Enabler made enormous progress in the small village of Hollandia by securing medical treatment for the son of one of the citizens. Ahaip, a three-year-old boy, was born with a birth defect that caused his intestines to form outside his body. This child was the darling of the village, but because of his condition, his life expectancy was short. Team Enabler was able to coordinate surgery for Ahaip at an Iraqi medical clinic in Najaf. In doing so, it won over the entire population of the village. The atmosphere and attitude of Hollandia permanently changed as a result of Team Enabler's efforts, paving the way for the maneuver commander to develop a relationship with the village leader, who later provided significant intelligence on extremist activities.

The Team Enabler concept is not without potential drawbacks. Because Team Enabler is its own maneuver

element, unless the maneuver commander and the CAT team leader are synchronized regarding desired effects and promises to be made, the maneuver commander may promise one thing and the CAT team leader another. It is imperative that CAT team leaders and maneuver commanders work closely together through detailed reporting and regular meetings. There is also a risk that maneuver commanders will not be completely involved in their AO because they see Team Enabler and lines of operation unrelated to security as not being their responsibility. In the end, conducting full-spectrum operations in an AO is the maneuver commander's responsibility. Team Enabler merely supports the maneuver commander, but when correctly employed, it is a powerful combat multiplier.

The Team Enabler concept can help maneuver commanders achieve their desired effects across all lines of operation. To be successful, however, the organization must be properly resourced and tied in closely with the unit's operations and objectives. The 3-1 Cav's experiences during OIF V demonstrate that the Team Enabler element can truly "enable" units to conduct successful full-spectrum operations in a challenging environment. **SW**

*Editor's note: While the 3-1 Cav's operations were successful, Civil Affairs doctrine makes clear that employing human-intelligence assets during the conduct of Civil Affairs operations must be done with great care. According to FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, "CA forces and CMO planners must maintain their credibility with the civilian populace and avoid the perception that their operations are directly related to intelligence activities."*

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# TOTAL TRANSFORMATION



by Colonel John G. Reilly

“The core of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School’s mission is to support Army special-operations forces’ ability to conduct operations worldwide by providing superior training, relevant doctrine, effective career-management policy and the highest quality Soldiers to man the Army’s premier special-operations fighting forces.”<sup>1</sup>

As an SF officer recently returned to the ARSOF community, and to SWCS in particular, I am amazed at SWCS’ ability to continue improving its training program.

Over the last three years, a concerted effort by the organization has resulted in a complete overhaul of qualification training programs as well as significant improvements in doctrine and proponentcy. This effort has allowed SWCS to maintain its well-deserved reputation as the best military schoolhouse in the world.

## Superior Training

“We are at war.” To the Soldiers and

civilians of SWCS, this statement is an ever-present drumbeat that guides the pace and intensity of everything done in the organization. Nowhere is this more evident than in the core mission area — training. The training cadre is aware that the next duty assignment for many of the ARSOF Soldiers, sister-service members and coalition members we train will be the battlefield. Ensuring that the training they receive prepares them for the battlefield is at the forefront of every decision made.

Thanks to a robust strategic-communications initiative, most readers likely know about the transformation of the Special Forces Qualification Course. The transformation of the pipeline brought sweeping changes to the way Special Forces Soldiers are trained and qualified. This initiative was undertaken in Fiscal Year 2005 and has since been fine-tuned. The chart on page 16 depicts the transformed SF-qualification pipeline.<sup>2</sup>

A closer look at the training conducted in the qualification pipeline reveals

that the organization is doing more in less time and has honed those skills that SF graduates need when they get to the SF detachment. Namely: shooting; advanced techniques; regional orientation; and language skills. At the outset of the course, students are formed into SF detachments based upon their assigned language and future unit of assignment, and they proceed through training as a unit. Through this new process, each student gains an inherently better understanding of the working relationships formed on the detachment and the skill sets brought by each military occupational specialty.

Special Forces Soldiers must be well-qualified with their personal weapons. In 2005, an SF candidate fired roughly 100 rounds of 5.56 mm ammunition during the conduct of the course. In other words, he qualified with his weapon. Today, SFQC students graduate qualified with the M-4; but there the similarity with the old pipeline ends. Each student in the transformed pipeline can expect to fire



more than 3,400 rounds of live ammunition in a series of exercises that make students proficient in tactical scenarios and familiarize them with advanced marksmanship (in urban settings, for example).

The revolution in language training is perhaps the most significant. In 2005, Soldiers were qualified in their MOS/Branch and awarded the Green Beret before receiving instruction in their assigned language. The goal for each Soldier was to achieve, at a minimum, a 0+/0+ score on the Defense Language Proficiency Test. Within the transformed pipeline, a Soldier is not qualified until he has achieved the standard of 1/1/1 on the DLPT.

Changes like this require the commitment of every member of the command to ensure that Soldiers succeed and a system and structure that coaches, teaches and mentors Soldiers, enabling their success. The schoolhouse has not only increased the effectiveness of the training process but also made a bold statement about the importance of language to SF in the conduct of its mission.

The chart below highlights, in more detail, the primary changes to the SFQC over the last two years.

The result of the changes instituted in phases one through four of the qualification course has been an undeniably positive growth of the culmina-

tion exercise, or CULEX, Robin Sage. This complex unconventional-warfare scenario has faced SF Soldiers as a “final hurdle” for decades. The length of the exercise and the ambiguity of the operational environment remain unchanged. The efforts of the cadre to further develop the auxiliary and the underground throughout Pineland has continued to expand the exercise’s access to challenging targets that parallel real-world missions.

What has changed most notably are the skill sets that student detachments and each individual student bring to the CULEX. Equipping students with language and advanced techniques early in the course and building detachments months in advance of Robin Sage has enabled the SWCS cadre to take the exercise to a higher level. Student detachments are now composed of Soldiers who have worked together before, are proficient in their assigned language, and are required to employ the full set of language and MOS skills during a Robin Sage that arguably surpasses the exercises of the past.


When the Global War on Terrorism began in 2001, Career Management Field 18 stood at 86-percent strength. In addition to the requirement to provide forces to fight the GWOT, the force was directed to increase in size by five active-duty battalions. The challenges facing SWCS as the proponent were immense. The chart below provides a better understanding of the gains made during this short period.

In 2004, with the application of increased resources, the CMF stood at 90 percent. Today, after the transformation of the pipeline, Special Forces enlisted strength is at 111 percent, and the SF Branch is poised to begin its approved growth (adding one SF battalion per year for the next five years).

### CHANGES IN THE SFQC PIPELINE

Pre-2005	2008
• Soldiers trained as individuals	• Soldiers trained as members of a team
• SECRET clearance not required	• SECRET clearance required
• Group/language assignment after Robin Sage	• Group/language assigned up front
• Language & SERE after graduation	• Increased focus on language and culture
• 0+/0+ Language “goal”	• 1/1/1 Language standard
• Little or no instruction in advanced techniques	• Advanced techniques
• SERE: nation-state only	• SERE: government & hostage-detention training
• Only 100+ rounds of live fire	• 3,400 rounds of live fire; tactical training and advanced marksmanship
• No regional orientation	• “Whole Man” SFAS
• Not relevant to COE	• SF tactics/CQB trained/relevant to COE
• Attrition designed throughout training	• Modular program; multi-task environment
• Little/ no training technology	• Blended learning via live, virtual reality and simulation; Soldiers issued laptops
• 63-week duration; lots of down time	• 48-54 weeks of training

## Special Forces Training Pipeline



If current recruiting and retention models hold true, the strength of the branch will remain above 95 percent during the growth period and will again reach or exceed 100 percent in 2014. Counterintuitively, the result of the increased number of SFQC graduates has been a decrease in resource requirements. Though SWCS' training programs have enjoyed a priority of funding within the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or USASOC, for the past several years, conservation of resources is imperative in today's environment. Operating a modular, agile SFQC has resulted in a 10-percent decrease in funding requirements (\$8 million per fiscal year).<sup>3</sup>

Coordinated and positive change is ongoing in other training programs, as well. The transformation of the active-duty Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations training pipelines is one current focus of the organization. The

changes under way build upon the lessons learned in the redesign of the SFQC. Officers and NCOs who undergo this training are organized into operational detachments at the outset of the course, receive training in their assigned language and executing a challenging CULEX based upon real-world scenarios taken from the GWOT.

Recognizing the requirements and capabilities of the reserve-component CA and PSYOP force, the SWCS commander, Major General James W. Parker, directed the development and implementation of a training program that combines resident- and distributed-learning curricula. Resident training is aligned across fiscal years in conjunction with standard RC annual-drill periods for the benefit of both the Soldier and his unit. Reserve Soldiers training under this schedule will attend the CULEX with their active-duty counterparts, ensuring that the force

receives CA and PSYOP Soldiers who are trained and qualified to the same standard. This program began in October 2007.

### Relevant Doctrine

While it is imperative that our Soldiers possess the tactical skills needed to succeed on the battlefield, that training must be firmly grounded in doctrine that is coordinated across the force. Just as SWCS has made great strides in its tactical training, it has also improved the doctrine-development process, with comparable success.

"We are at war" is the watchword for doctrine development, as well. The subject-matter experts, writers and editors of the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, or DOTD, do not operate in a vacuum. Constant communication with Soldiers in the field and with their counterparts in the conventional and joint realm ensure that ARSOF doc-



trine remains relevant by capturing the emerging doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures, or TTPs, from the GWOT that will stand our force in good stead for years to come.

The USASOC commander has prioritized SWCS for manning, and funding resulting in a 105-percent staffing of military authorizations.<sup>4</sup> The result has been a tremendous influx of combat-proven officers, warrant officers and NCOs into 1st Special Warfare Training Group and the DOTD. These Soldiers have had a profound effect on the currency of ARSOF doctrine and the coordination and incorporation of ARSOF concepts and doctrine into joint and Army doctrinal publications.

The production of ARSOF doctrine sets the standard for the Army, with an average publication age of 21 months. Relevant ARSOF doctrine is being integrated effectively into other publications, as well. The Joint and Army Integration Division of the DOTD reviewed 233 joint and Army manuals in Calendar Year 2006 and has reviewed more than 152 to date.<sup>5</sup> In many instances, SWCS' "critical" comments/recommendations for change have affected the final Army or joint manual. For example, SWCS doctrine developers played an essential role in the coordination of all drafts of FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. In all cases, SWCS has ensured that the latest organizational structures and operational concepts are understood by ARSOF's joint SOF and Army counterparts.

ARSOF contributions to the force's understanding of contemporary operational missions and structures are vital, current and in-demand. FM 3-05, *Army Special Operations Forces* (Sept. 2006), the ARSOF capstone and Army keystone publication, synchronizes ARSOF doctrine with joint and Army manuals and identifies the contributions that ARSOF make.

This manual articulates, for the first time, the command-and-control structures that are in place and working successfully in the GWOT. It clearly explains how special-operations task forces, or SOTFs, are formed and organized, and it identifies the SF group headquarters as the preferred ARSOF headquarters for SOTF formation. The manual also explains the targeting, communications, intelligence and logistics functions that define how ARSOF operates unilaterally and in the joint, interagency and multinational environments.

While the current manuals and TTPs capture how the force operates today, an equally important aspect of SWCS' doctrinal responsibility is charting a course for the future. SWCS' contributions to this area are ensuring that the unique capabilities of ARSOF are developed to remain in line with the overarching vision and guidance of USASOC and the U.S. Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM. The documents laying out future force applications for SOF will ensure that SOF, and ARSOF in particular, remain an integrated, relevant and in-demand element of the national arsenal.

The 2006 capstone concept for special operations published by USSOCOM, with SWCS input, clearly outlines the need for the joint SOF community to operate in an integrated fashion. Working drafts of the subsequent concept of joint expeditionary SOF more clearly define how the joint force will be task-organized into joint effects teams, or JETs, by mission set. All ARSOF units (Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Ranger, aviation and sustainment units) are incorporated into the way joint SOF will fight in the future. For example, SF groups, around which today's JSOTFs are formed, are included as a headquarters of choice around

which JETs will be built, solidifying SF's role on the battlefield of tomorrow.

In addition to the active updates to ARSOF doctrine, the means of delivery have been modernized. ARSOF doctrine has pioneered the use of embedded video and narration to explain difficult concepts and has begun to use a strategic-communications campaign to introduce new doctrinal concepts, publications and concepts to the force via briefings, video teleconferencing and Web postings. A recently published PSYOP TTP manual, FM 3-05.301 *Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, posted to the Army Knowledge Online Web portal, has been downloaded 2,384 times by 2,138 unique user accounts since it was posted in August 2007.<sup>6</sup> This illustrates both that the Web is a viable means of disseminating doctrine and that the force is reading the doctrine published. SWCS' approach toward modernization and accessibility, with a focus on maintaining currency in ARSOF doctrine and the nesting of ARSOF doctrine with future Army and joint concepts, was key in the transformation of the doctrine cycle.

## **Effective Career Management**

Three years ago, SWCS was the proponent for Special Forces, and it trained Soldiers in the functional areas of Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs. The Special Forces Branch for officers and the CMF for NCOs have matured since their creation in 1987. As described earlier in this article, the management of the force and the ability of SWCS to provide trained and ready SF Soldiers to meet the needs of the force have met an unprecedented level of success. One organizational change that has contributed to this success was the creation of the Special Operations



▲ **THE NEGOTIATOR** Soldiers going through the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations training pipeline negotiate in real-world scenarios during the training CULEX. *U.S. Army photo.*

Recruiting Battalion, or SORB, in July 2005. As the proponent of the force, SWCS recognized the challenges that exist in recruiting and assessing qualified enlisted Soldiers and officers. The specified mission of the recruiting battalion was internal and external recruitment of eligible candidates for service in Special Forces. The success described above in the

core-mission area of training and achieving the SF strength we now have is in part attributable to the efforts of the SORB. Its success is best exemplified by Staff Sergeant Mark Hawver, an 18C assigned as a SORB recruiter and stationed at Fort Drum, N.Y., being named the 2007 U.S. Army Recruiting Command Noncommissioned Officer of the Year.

Fiscal Year 2007 was declared the “year of CA and PSYOP.” In keeping with the SWCS commander’s guidance, the priority of effort in the organization shifted to CA and PSYOP issues. Changes in the PSYOP and CA arena are vast. Today, the command is responsible for career management and training of the two newest CMFs/branches in the Army. PSYOP and CA were officially recognized as branches of the Army Oct. 16, 2006. SWCS has taken on its new responsibility with the same intensity with which it approached the creation of the Special Forces Branch in the late 1980s. At the outset of the fiscal year, the SORB began actively recruiting CA and PSYOP enlisted Soldiers and officers for the active force. In the areas of recruiting, selecting, training and professionally developing the CA and PSYOP force, SWCS has set the conditions for success through guidance, policy and action by:

- Eliciting and considering input from the force prior to instituting change.
- Instituting an accession process administered by the Department of the Army G1 at the Army Human Resources Command for active-duty officers in CA and PSYOP.
- Changing a nine-week NCO MOS-transition course to a 42-week qualification course that produces a professional 37/38 series NCO who speaks a foreign language and has worked in a team context with officers of the branch.
- Introducing a team-oriented culmination exercise into CA and PSYOP qualification training that places NCOs and officers in scenarios taken from the GWOT.
- Redesigning the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course for CA and PSYOP NCOs and incorporating it





▲ **FULLY TRAINED** Soldiers graduating from the Special Forces training pipeline stand in formation at the Regimental First Formation. Upon completion of the transformed training pipeline, Soldiers possess more language and cultural skills and warrior skills than ever before. This increased level of training allows them to enter the operational groups prepared for the fight. *U.S. Army photo.*

into the training pipeline.

- Developing and teaching a CA Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course, or ANCOC, and continuing to conduct the PSYOP ANCOC course.

- Recognizing the regional-orientation and foreign-language requirements of the active-duty force and including the necessary training in the redesigned pipeline.

- Recognizing the unique requirements of the Army Reserve and developing a qualification pipeline to meet the needs of the citizen-Soldier.

- Instituting a proactive strategic-communications plan to ensure that the force understands the transformation under way.

The prognosis for the impact of these efforts is good. The pacing item for the active force is the captain grade for officers and the staff sergeant grade for NCOs. Given current trends in recruiting, training and retention, the force should achieve 90 percent in these grades by FY 2009. For the USAR, SWCS is postured to train all assessed Soldiers required to meet the growth approved in the Program Decision Memorandum.

From resident and nonresident training, to the publication and integration of ARSOF doctrine, to the establishment and management of policy that ensures the finest SF, CA and PSYOP Soldiers are manning the

force, SWCS continues to improve. The future of ARSOF looks bright; it's good to be back.**SW**

*Notes:*

<sup>1</sup> Interview with Major General James W. Parker, *Special Operations Technology*, Vol. 3, Issue 6, 2005, 29.

<sup>2</sup> SWCS transformation briefing.

<sup>3</sup> Personal interview with the chief, Resource Management Office, USAJFKSWCS, Oct. 16, 2007.

<sup>4</sup> Personal interview with the USAJFKSWCS G1, Oct. 16, 2007.

<sup>5</sup> Personal interview with the chief, Joint and Army Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, USAJFKSWCS, Oct. 16, 2007.

<sup>6</sup> Figures from the Army Knowledge Online Web-hit counter, as of Oct. 18, 2007.

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# A GRATEFUL NATION REMEMBERS

## OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

MAJ Jeffrey R. Calero • SSG Jesse G. Clowers Jr. • SSG Joseph  
SSG Robert J. Miller • SFC Sean K. Mitchell • SSG William R. M

## OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

MAJ James M. Ahearn • SGM Bradly D. Conner  
SFC Justin S. Monschke • SSG Robert R. Pire





# ERS

F. Curreri • SFC Jeffrey D. Kettle • SGT Charles B. Kitowski III • SSG Patrick F. Kutschbach • SPC George V. Libby • MSG Arthur L. Lilley •  
Neil Jr. • SGT Timothy P. Padgett • SSG Michael D. Thomas • SSG Joshua R. Whitaker

r • CPL Benjamin C. Dillon • SFC Adrian M. ElizaIde • SGT Steven C. Ganczewski • CPL Jason M. Kessler • SGT Keith A. Kline • SSG Ryan D. Maseth •  
lli • SSG Robb L. Roling • CPT Benjamin D. Tiffner • SFC Michael J. Tully • SSG Justin R. Whiting • SFC Nathan L. Winder







# ‘Operationalizing’ Intelligence

BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM G. BOYKIN (USA RET.) AND SCOTT SWANSON



***Information is anything that can be known, regardless of how it is discovered. Intelligence refers to information that meets the stated or understood needs of [the users] and has been collected, processed, and narrowed to meet those needs. Intelligence is a subset of the broader category of information. Intelligence and the entire process by which it is identified, obtained, and analyzed respond to the needs of [users]. All intelligence is information; not all information is intelligence.***

--Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*

In today's irregular battlespaces, lethal and nonlethal operations alike require a rapid, socially sensitive awareness that is derived from intelligence operations. That requirement applies equally to counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and counterdrug activities. Whether their goal is to find, isolate, disrupt, deter, deny, influence or neutralize enemy activities, operations need to avoid inflicting inadvertent consequences, either as unintended casualties or global political fallout.

In order to leverage human intelligence, or HUMINT, today's complex operational environments require a comprehensive understanding of the human social and psychological dimensions, advanced intelligence capabilities for information-collection, and military source operations, or MSO, which involve the collection from, by or through humans of foreign, military and military-related intelligence. Success in these environments also requires a heightened battlespace analysis that provides the capability to rapidly gather, interpret and act on time-sensitive information.

Unfortunately, traditional techniques of information-collection and reconnaissance can be difficult in

the irregular battlespace because of various human-terrain factors that deny or compromise observation. More advanced intelligence operations can be conducted to circumvent such challenges, but only if the intelligence analysis that supports mission planning is attuned to the particular battlespace.

Special-operations forces, or SOF, remain one of the most important elements for executing improved information-collection operations and intelligence assessments. SOF commanders can improve cultural and social awareness by adjusting the way they task their intel personnel to collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence.

When available intelligence lacks the information necessary for planning SOF operations, it is critical that the SOF commander obtain the necessary intelligence and perform a supplementary analysis. The 18F Special Forces intelligence sergeant can be a great asset by helping the commander adjust the way he requests intelligence, integrates intelligence personnel within teams and plans supplemental intelligence missions to ensure the maximum knowledge of the human terrain.

## Operationalizing intel

As they execute their mission-essential tasks, SOF commanders have an imperative to acquire a situational awareness that will also provide the basis for efficient planning that minimizes risk. SOF planning, performed within the theater of operations, often requires critical information that, for a variety of reasons, may be unavailable or not operationalized, that is, not available in a format relevant to SOF operations.

In SOF operations, the commander focuses on an environment that includes the area of influence, all adjacent areas, and areas ex-

tending into enemy territory that contain the objectives of current and planned operations. With such a broad scope to consider, the commander requires intelligence that addresses both tactical requirements and the big-picture strategy. In order to provide an appropriate operational analysis and understanding, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, or IPB, and other planning mechanisms must therefore be tied to SOF operations in order to ensure that planners will have access to the best available and most usable intelligence.

Successful planning is not based solely on how well the intelligence user defines the intelligence requirements, or IRs. The intelligence product also requires skilled analysts who can discern, discriminate, filter, correlate and disseminate intelligence. Such intelligence may have to compete with contradictory information that often lacks the methodical evaluation and contextual application that SOF warfighters need.

When intelligence is operationalized, risks and options become more apparent. The resulting comprehensive awareness enhances insight, improves mission planning and heightens tactical performance by allowing quick and sure responses to rapidly shifting conditions.

Operational intelligence has two main foundations:

1) Assessments - "Intel drives ops." Customized operational intelligence, synthesized with analytical rigor, either enables planning for a specific operational environment or highlights additional requirements for intelligence collection.

2) Missions - "Intel-driven ops." Intelligence operations conducted primarily to collect information related to priority intelligence requirements, PIRs, or to develop military sources, as opposed to be-





▲ **RISK FACTOR** When intelligence is operationalized, risks and options become more apparent. The resulting comprehensive awareness enhances insight, improves mission planning and heightens tactical performance by allowing quick and sure responses to rapidly shifting conditions. *U.S. Army photo.*

ing a secondary objective of other missions.

## Assessments

Intelligence can provide a competitive advantage only if its various pieces are matched with operational experience and intuition, reasoning and analytical skills honed for the specific situation. In special operations, intelligence planning is usually tasked to the staff of the S2, G2, C2 or J2. These staffs are responsible for intelligence procurement and interpretation. If the intelligence personnel are unskilled, their typical response is to disseminate a “data-dump” of raw intelligence or to perform increased, unfocused collection activities, rather than to perform an enhanced analysis and distill PIRs or to manageable levels.

Most failures of battlefield intel-

ligence are due not to insufficient data or intelligence-collection efforts but instead to intelligence products that were either ignored or analytically weak. The products are often weak because the analyst is unskilled or uses an intuition-based, or “gut-based,” approach instead of a systematic process, or because rigid analytical processes and templated frameworks do not provide the responses that missions demand. Another problem in intelligence is mirror-imaging, in which the analyst bases his findings on the assumption that foreigners will think about matters in the same way as Americans do.

For example, a commander may be preparing for a foreign internal defense, or FID, deployment to North Africa that could involve working with indigenous Tuareg tribes in the

Sahara. Based only on observations and some internal examination, the S2 may have concluded that Tuaregs are lazy, which the commander and his team may interpret as a signal to push the Tuaregs harder in training or to expect less cooperation from them. However, that analysis is weak: The truth may be that untrained observations have concentrated on an isolated group of individuals performing their social-cultural roles within the Tuareg caste system. In reality, an approach that would motivate or engage the Tuaregs would need to be based upon an understanding of their cultural conditions and their view of society. Approaches that might motivate U.S. troops could in fact offend the Tuaregs and create a resistance to cooperation. The result would be a negative relationship with a group that could assist SOF



▲ **THE HUMAN TERRAIN** By having a broad knowledge of cultures and the indigenous population, SOF can make their operations more successful. *U.S. Army photo.*

in counterterrorism initiatives or in intelligence support.

In the Tuareg illustration, a better, operationalized approach would take a broader look at the indigenous people, focusing on insights garnered from their social history and culture, and apply the findings to the execution of a particular operation and to the team's understanding of the people. In addition, the success of the mission should be evaluated in terms of short- and long-term goals, relationships formed with the Tuaregs and regional interests. A commander may ask himself: Does the analyst understand our FID intelligence-support requirements? Is the analyst a subject-matter expert who understands the indigenous society and culture? Are the IRs and PIRs specific enough to yield useful operational

information, or will they reflect the analyst's narrow opinion and his need to simply check a box on an IPB template? Perhaps the commander could advise the intelligence staff of a target-analysis tool that Special Forces Soldiers use during their mission assessment: CARVER/DSHARPP (criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect and recognizability/demography, symbolism, history, accessibility, recognizability, population and proximity).

### Improving assessments

Our analysis of the battlespace must also be improved in the area of predictive analysis. It is not enough simply to have a list of forecasted assumptions about the area or the adversary. Intelligence needs to include validated information about the building blocks

required for a particular scenario or flashpoint to materialize and clues that would indicate their presence.

The requirements for a predictive analysis of enemy activity include the intentions, will, capabilities and vulnerabilities of enemy groups and individuals. Analysis can be biased and may simply seek information that reinforces the way the analyst views the theater's inhabitants. To ensure that the intelligence assessment will not be based solely on the biases of one person or group, it should also include competing theories.

When commanders are concerned about time constraints, they frequently may not task their collectors and analysts for additional intelligence on the human terrain. They rely instead on their teams to augment the available information as they conduct



their missions. Ideally, when information is not available, more interaction between the commander and the intelligence analyst would allow the analyst to describe what is known about a particular scenario indicator and what key intelligence questions still need to be answered. The commander would in turn express his mission tasking and available options for refining and refocusing intelligence collection and analysis.

At times, the information the S2 needs to arrive at a conclusion may be too difficult to obtain, so team databases or intelligence products may simply be stuffed with nuggets of information, in hopes that the user will find appropriately insightful items. Planning for SOF operations can no longer tolerate inadequacies

to operational activities. The analysis will therefore offer little insight or contextual understanding of the way a particular piece of intelligence should be considered or whether its use may have unintended effects.

## Missions

Another enhancement to operational intelligence would be the conduct of more counterthreat and counteraction activities to collect intelligence clandestinely or to gain intelligence insights for missions. Insurgencies and guerrilla movements facilitated through illicit border-crossing activities from Iran, Syria and Pakistan into Iraq and Afghanistan rely on mobility, elusiveness and availability of a safe-haven. The trade and transport of drugs, arms and

method. The best way to break up complex, social-network-driven activities is to ensure that the network's linchpins are identified and removed or discredited with minimal disruption of the ancillary social terrain.

These linchpins and their higher-level activities for "hostile" insurgency acts and drug-transport purposes are typically masked by day-to-day socially networked routines. That makes it virtually impossible for outsiders who are not part of the local structure to identify anything in particular as being illicit. In this complex operational environment, special-operations personnel should maintain a persistent presence mingling with the locals and their commerce, cultivating trust and goodwill, thereby increasing opportunities for developing potential

**"Focusing on the human terrain could give the commander more mission options and provide targeting for information operations. Human factors are the motivating forces behind mobilization, opportunity, resistance or support."**

in the analysis of human terrain and battlefield atmospherics simply because it is difficult to collect the necessary intelligence.

To date, attempts to make operational sense of massive amounts of unorganized data collected for missions often focus on obscure, technical, computer-based collection structures and complex mathematical algorithms rather than on realistic improvements to the analysis of relationships and human intelligence. Further, most analysis of these collections of information will be isolated from the operational environment in which the data originated, and the analysts will therefore be unable to apply the appropriate perspective to the intelligence assessment and correlate data

humans rely on the same factors. All these illicit acts require significant active and passive civilian material support, which is deeply rooted in the human sociological framework.

Focusing on the human terrain could give the commander more mission options and provide targeting for information operations. Human factors are the motivating forces behind mobilization, opportunity, resistance or support. Countering illicit acts can be challenging when they are intermingled with ordinary, lawful activities that are central to an inhabited area. Targeting often resorts to direct-action operations, because low-level targets are the most identifiable and available for engagement. Targeting the social network for intelligence collection through MSO is a better

sources for intelligence operations, counterinsurgency activities and stability initiatives.

Successful synergies of local-intelligence collection and MSO can be traced back to the Office of Strategic Services. The OSS developed underground associates; organized guerrilla groups and supplied them with funds or materiel; and performed local work, such as farming and tending livestock, to better observe enemy movements.

Operational intelligence activities must be similarly dedicated to, teamed with and supported by operationalized intelligence analysis to ensure mission success and the proper identification of appropriate intelligence targets. Refining analysis through real-time observations at the

operator level must become a primary function, because the majority of available, prefabricated intelligence will be either dated or of too high a level for the commander to use.

An example will support that point: In Iraq and Afghanistan, the ability to remain in place clandestinely over extended periods of time can be compromised by the area's high density of children, animals and families, who may alert the target under observation. Furthermore, intelligence support to SOF units lacks the local nuances required for them to work effectively within small areas. The result is that recon teams in these areas have become less oriented on physical terrain and more oriented on people for intelligence and insights.

Special Forces use a host of collection assets in trying to satisfy the ever-shifting PIRs of operational commanders and their subordinate elements. At its base camp, the team can rely on its internal organization to accomplish its mission, with enhancement by force-multiplying indigenous camp residents and proximate locals. Advanced collection operations against broadly networked, decentralized threats require additional human sources and informants, electro-optics ground sensors, small measurement and signatures intelligence devices, unmanned aerial sensors, ground and fixed-wing signals intelligence and enhanced human-intelligence MSO.

These collection capabilities enable effective target examination for identifying enemies, tracking illicit activities and assessing risk factors, which are based on a range of motivational, ideological and social factors that can't be observed when intelligence collection is a cursory activity of a mission. By enhancing the role of intelligence operations, SOF personnel can find subtle, ambiguous or fleeting observables that indicate seemingly

hidden enemy activities or behaviors. Operators must not only collect this information but also quickly record and report mission results, which will prompt additional analysis and result in a better understanding of the situational atmospherics.

SOF field collectors are able to immerse themselves within an area and have daily contact with numerous sources. With their analytical skills, they develop a capacity for judgment, and they may be in the best position to comprehend indicators or warnings that likely would not set off the same alarms within the larger intel apparatus. Under many circumstances, their comprehension is beyond the scope of a distant analyst, who may frequently discard what he deems as irrelevant information. In short, the local collectors can become their own camp-based intelligence community.

## Best practices

Improvements to the operational intelligence domain do not require a complex overhaul of the doctrine for special operations or intelligence. From the moment they contemplate operations, commanders and intelligence specialists can launch a continuing, interactive process to develop and refine the estimate of any situation. Within that process, the commander's operational requirements must be the principal determinants of the intelligence-system components, staff organization, intel services and products. Simultaneously, intelligence personnel must act as expert advisers.

The process of operationalizing intelligence, driven by the commander and supported by an advisory intelligence expert, will bring greater specificity to mission planning and execution. By customizing insights and findings, it ensures that everyone is working with the same data and situational awareness to create a plan for specific contingencies. When correctly

managed, the intelligence will be more proactive and pre-emptive and less a reactive, "off the shelf" product that has not been framed for the situation.

Once intelligence has been operationalized, its content can correlate to the desired operational effects, adding flexibility and agility to planning and execution. Such refinement enables the intelligence tradecraft, collection architecture and deeper social-cultural observation required for gathering the actionable insights needed for engaging complex enemy centers of gravity.

Under the intelligence-operations framework, SOF commanders can enhance their mission success with timely insights that minimize the risk of direct-action civil infringements and unintended opportunities for insurgent propaganda. Without proper intelligence guidance, capture-and-kill solutions can have significant countereffects: alienating and angering the inhabitants of a region, as well as people in bordering regions. The perceived social infractions create more discontent within communities and increase the resistance to participation that SOF are trying to deter.

## Conclusion

To conclude, when implemented as doctrine, an effective framework for building ideal intelligence and decision-making dynamics corresponds to the current procedures of Joint Pub 2-0, *Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations*. Best practices of turning information into intelligence can immediately improve the quality of interaction, insights and mission success by six factors:

- 1) Inclusion. Until the completion of the operation, the intelligence staff should participate in virtually all decision-making and planning that is based on an active intelligence estimate. Integration of the intelligence personnel embedded with the SF teams, whether they are for-



mally assigned or temporarily dedicated, should be encouraged by the SOF commander. The operationally focused individual will learn more about intelligence and intelligence-collection capabilities, while the intelligence personnel will learn the mission types and associated tasks to which SOF groups and battalions respond, as well as how to inject intelligence-based assets and capabilities into the operational concept. The interactive process will soon transform the intelligence specialist into the commanding officer's adviser instead of a low-level support arm.

2) Focus. Effective support to the commander requires synchronized, detailed intelligence framed in the context and the requirements of operations. This focus helps all parties determine their priorities and should be used to determine whether additional collection operations can fill information gaps. Intelligence-driven targeting is especially effective when the intelligence personnel are well-schooled in the operational arts of SOF missions. From the onset, the intel staff should establish a set of lines-of-operation collection tasks, and the commander should support it. From these collection tasks, analysts can create a subset of questions for each task. These questions become the IRs that can be assigned to a collector. When the refinement and updates are ready for the commander, another process of distillation and evaluation can turn information gaps into PIRs.

3) Missions. Operational forces must be tasked to collect information, employ locals as intelligence sources and report all discoveries. The information from MSO, reconnaissance and surveillance must be integrated with intelligence from other sources to ensure primacy for future operations. Examination and cross-referencing of multiple sources of intelligence also enhance the quality of analysis by reducing the possibility that information anomalies may be assessed as a "big picture" finding.

4) Framework. Establish an opera-

tions-intelligence architecture (task force or fusion cell) for greater coordination and situational awareness, with specific emphasis on fusion analysis, collection management, targeting and theater human-terrain expertise. The Joint Intelligence Operations Center model, facilitating the tactical overwatch program, is a similar concept. An intelligence infrastructure must be created to ensure a unity of effort for complete, accurate and current intelligence that will develop the best possible understanding of the adversary and the situation and reduce unnecessary duplication. Members of the intelligence staff and mission-planners cannot operate in a vacuum; therefore, the integration, consolidation and expanded access to intelligence and operations in a "war room" or "battle pit" can foster better harmony of efforts to ensure that the commander's priorities are being met. Consolidation also minimizes the withholding of information, because there are no walls or stovepipes to act as barriers.

5) Flexibility. Intelligence structures, methodologies, databases, products and personnel must be flexible enough to meet changing operational situations, needs, priorities and opportunities, and they must apply to all possible strategies and tactics. Intelligence-related technology and processes must be less complicated and constraining than the operations they are facilitating. Often intelligence products are incorrectly prioritized to look doctrinally correct, as opposed to ensuring that they are effective for mission targeting and assisting the commander to meet his objectives. Technological analytical tools can be helpful, but they must be user-friendly, or they may cause confusion and frustration for the analyst.

6) Backup. Augment national- and theater-level intelligence support with a "virtual" reach-back and reach-forward capability of subject-matter experts to enhance the ability to turn available information into actionable insights. At times, national and

theater intelligence organizations may not be able to produce specific operational insight because of constraints in access, capability, capacity or expertise. During those times, commanders benefit from supplemental experts who may come from the private sector, academia or other parts of the public sector that have knowledge or connections pertaining to intelligence needs dealing with areas, peoples, operational concepts, etc. **SW**

*Authors' note: Special thanks to CWO 4 Charles Hof (USA, ret.), Elizabeth MacIntosh (OSS, ret.) and Barbara Podoski (OSS, ret.).*

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# SHOOTERS AND THINKERS:

## THE SPECIAL FORCES SNIPER COURSE

BY SERGEANT MAJOR PETER A. GOULD

“One shot, one kill” has long been the sniper’s creed, but with the changing nature of warfare, that skill is not always enough. In the ongoing war on terror, Army special-operations units often need small teams of snipers who can infiltrate an area undetected, collect and transmit relevant and prioritized real-time information, deliver precision fires and train host-nation snipers.

Soldiers who possess those critical skills are much in demand, and training ARSOF snipers in relevant skills and in sufficient numbers to meet the mission requirements of ARSOF units is the responsibility of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, which teaches the Special Forces Sniper Course, or SFSC.

The 35-day SFSC is designed to produce ARSOF snipers who can infiltrate a rural or urban area undetected, account for the ballistic effects of various weapons and ammunition, understand and adjust for the effects of weather on their operations, and employ their weapons systems efficiently at ranges out to 800 meters. Tasked with the mission of training these capabilities and coaching and mentoring students, the cadre of the SFSC, from Company D, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, conducts the SFSC five times

each year.

In March 2007, SWCS renamed the course, adopting its current name in favor of the previous one, the Special Operations Target Interdiction Course, or SOTIC. With the name change came a redesign of the course curriculum, and students’ contact hours increased from 1,900 to more than 3,300. Some of the curriculum changes included extending the course length by five days in order to integrate assault-operations training with that of the Special Forces Advanced Reconnaissance, Target Analysis and Exploitation Techniques Course, or SFARTAETC. With the course redesign, Company D increased the course capacity from 24 to 32 students in each SFSC class.

Improvements to the training facilities also gave the students additional training time. In the past, for two weeks during each class, students spent half days working targets in the rifle pits. The automation of the primary field-fire range meant that students no longer needed to work targets, giving them seven more training days.

### COURSE STRUCTURE

On today’s battlefield, ARSOF snipers require not only tactical proficiency in their duties but also techno-

logical savvy in the use of collection methods and hardware, optics and communications equipment. To keep pace with emerging requirements and to expose students to the challenges that snipers face on the battlefield, SFSC used the additional training time gained from the course redesign to incorporate critical tasks that the SOTIC curriculum lacked. The SFSC curriculum now includes these additional tasks designed to keep ARSOF snipers relevant and make them more lethal:

- Employ gas-operated sniper systems (SR-25/M-110 SASS), both day and night and in rural and urban environments, while engaging stationary targets, moving targets and targets with limited exposure times. (Note: the M-24 Sniper Weapon System is still the primary weapon system employed during SFSC.)

- Employ the Barrett M-107 sniper weapon, both day and night.

- Conduct technical-surveillance familiarization.

- Familiarize students with current tactical reconnaissance kit.

- Employ the tactical reconnaissance kit and equipment.

- Select urban surveillance/firing positions and construct urban hide sites.

- Conduct urban stalking.



- Learn building-climbing techniques (ascending and descending).
- Collect and manage information.
- Operate a tactical information center.
- Learn collection methods and techniques.
- Conduct close-target reconnaissance.
- Conduct long-range, stand-off observation.
- Learn vehicle-reconnaissance tactics, techniques and procedures, or TTP.
- Learn walk-by TTP.
- Learn to operate manned and unmanned remote sites.
- Demonstrate planning considerations for sniper operations.
- Plan urban and rural operations.
- Conduct time-sensitive planning.
- Develop target stand-alone products for near- and long-term use.
- Develop RECCE concept of operation.
- Learn to shoot from aerial platforms (familiarization only).
- Spend two additional days of sniper and field-shoot marksmanship events in preparation for must-pass exams.

During the final four days of SFSC training, students are integrated with students from SFARTAETC for a collective live-fire exercise. When they complete the course, graduates are qualified as SOF level-I snipers and are awarded the additional skill identifier W3.

## PREPARATION

The two major reasons for SFSC attrition are the sniper-marksmanship exam and the field-shoot exam, both of which assess fundamental sniper skills. Cumulative course scores lower than 70 percent are another major reason for attrition. Typically, shooters who do not attain a 70-percent cumulative score have barely met the course standards in a number of events, and they drop out late in the course.

Historically, SOTIC had a pass rate of 80 percent. Since the new SFSC program of instruction, or POI, was adopted in 2007, the course has maintained a pass rate of 63 percent. The difference in the pass rate makes it appear that SFSC has higher standards, but that is not true. SFSC uses the same shooting standards and task progressions that SOTIC did, with one exception: Students now get two more days of shooting in preparation for the must-pass exams,



▲ **ON THE HUNT** An SF Soldier practices stalking in the Special Forces Sniper Course at Fort Bragg, N.C. Photo by K. Kassens.

which should actually help to increase pass rates. Furthermore, SFSC does not teach new tasks until after the two major must-pass events, in order not to interfere with the progressive nature of the training.

Higher attrition rates could be attributed to the new student demographic. The average Soldier attending SFSC during the last two years typically lacks core competency skills because of repeated combat rotations and limited resources down range for sustaining basic skills. Many students excel at shooting, but during the stress of an exam, they cannot apply the skills they have already learned and demonstrated. To meet the standard, students must

be able to perform advanced tasks on demand, not at their leisure.

Soldiers who attend SFSC need to possess the core competencies, as they are the building blocks for advanced shooting skills. Students must have fundamental skills in combat marksmanship, chiefly the ability to fire expert on a 300-meter qualification range using an M-4 rifle with standard iron sights. SFSC historical data shows that Soldiers who can achieve this standard have a greater likelihood of meeting the course shooting requirements and graduating.

Age, military occupational specialty and years of service are not discriminating factors in the SFSC — even a

combat veteran does not automatically possess competencies in weapons-handling skills, as has been evidenced in nearly every SFSC and SFARTAETC class. Team sergeants and company sergeants major need to closely scrutinize Soldiers selected to attend SFSC, to ensure that they possess and demonstrate marksmanship skills and core Soldier competencies.

In October 2007, in an effort to select candidates who have a greater chance of achieving the requirements for being a Level-I ARSOF sniper, SWCS implemented a diagnostic shoot as a prerequisite for SFSC attendance. Students arrive for training with a letter from their commander stating that they have achieved expert standards. The prerequisite shoot simply ensures that they can indeed meet that standard. The shoot requires candidates to fire five five-round shot groups from 25 meters, using an M-4 rifle with iron sights. Three of the five-round groups must be equal to or less than 1 ¼ inches in diameter. A 1 ¼-inch-diameter group at 25 meters subtends to a target hit on an E-type target at 300 meters.

During the first SFSC class in which the diagnostic shoot was implemented, only eight of the 32 candidates met the standard. Of those eight, seven graduated, and all passed the shooting evaluations. The one student who did not complete the course failed to meet the 70-percent cumulative-score requirement. Because only eight candidates achieved the standard, the remaining 24 course slots in that class were filled with Soldiers who were able to shoot 1 ½-inch groups. Only 12 of those 24 — 50 percent — passed the SFSC course requirements.

A Soldier enrolled through the Army Training Requirements and Resources System is not guaranteed attendance to SFSC. He must pass the diagnostic shooting exam on day one, or he will be returned to his home station on day one with his target. To prepare for attendance, at a minimum, Soldiers should practice grouping and should consistently shoot expert on a 300-meter qualification range using iron sights. Although a level-II sniper qualification is not a prerequisite for SFSC, Soldiers who have that level of competency will learn exponentially more from the course than a Soldier will who does not possess that level of skill.

No student need bring his own

weapon systems. SFSC provides all weapon systems and optics that students need for completing the course. It is highly recommended that students not attempt to complete the course using their unit's assigned systems, simply to avoid the wear and tear on unit equipment. All SFSC systems easily meet or exceed the requirements for meeting course standards.

## FACILITIES

The 2nd Battalion has also built new sniper training facilities and upgraded many of the existing facilities in order to provide an optimal training environment. Improvements include the automation of Range 66E, the establishment of an automated 400-meter range at Range 37 and the renovation of a classroom to support training students on the use of technical-surveillance equipment, or TSE. Unfortunately, the 400-meter range at Range 37 cannot support unit-specific sniper training or train-ups. The range overlaps other facilities that must be closed when it is being used. For that reason, use of the 400-meter range is limited to students in SFSC and SFAR-TAETC, and when they are not using the range, it is closed.

Working with the Range Branch of the United States Army Special Operations Command, SWCS has developed a four-story sniper tower and a two-story mobile urban targetry façade that are scheduled to begin construction this year. By allowing students to train more thoroughly for the urban battlefield, the facility upgrades mean two things: more relevant training and an ARSOF sniper who is better qualified to infiltrate a target, obtain timely and accurate information and provide lethal fires.

## OFF-SITE TRAINING

Operational detachments in the SF groups are encouraged to contact the SFSC cadre for specific information on curriculum changes and ways that they can be applied to level-II sniper training programs at the SF-group level. With larger SFSC class sizes, a longer course length and a greater number of instructor-student contact hours, there is a greater requirement for instructor manpower in SFSC. Because of the demand, the cadre cannot currently send mobile sniper training teams to the Special Forces groups.

SF groups that want to conduct sniper-training programs using mobile training teams, or MTTs, need to be aware that the SFSC POI has changed. To meet the requirements of the new POI, groups would need to provide either an automated 800-meter range similar to the one on Fort Bragg or a trained pit team of 10 Soldiers dedicated to running the target-line pit for all shooting events. The four-day live-fire exercise at the end of the course demands at least an SF-detachment-sized element of Soldiers who are either training in Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat or SFAUC-qualified.

Because the new POI includes TSE familiarization, the MTT would need to have TSE expertise, as the SFSC cadre is committed to teaching SFSC classes. The cadre plans to address the means and requirement for off-site training in the future.

## FUTURE

As Army Special Forces Soldiers and Rangers continue to operate at the tip of the spear, there will be an ongoing need for highly trained ARSOF snipers who can think through problems and bring the right tools to bear to win the day and never default to any single technique.

Sniper technology and battlefield locations will change with time, and as they do, the SFSC cadre will adjust training to meet the new challenges while continuing to produce the most highly trained and lethal sniper — one who is capable of collecting and relaying vital information while simultaneously making “one shot, one kill.” *SW*

Sergeant Major Peter A. Gould is the sergeant major for Company D, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, the sniper proponent for the U.S. Army. During 25 years in Special Forces, he has conducted a variety of SF missions and combat tours spanning three continents. Sergeant Major Gould graduated from the Special Operations Target Interdiction Course in 1990 as the distinguished honor graduate and was subsequently assigned as a SOTIC instructor. He has spent the last two years ensuring that sniper tactics, techniques and procedures taught in the SFSC are up-to-date and relevant to current and future operations in the war on terrorism.



# Ground Truth

## MOEAAT gives commanders reliable data



by Major Darin J. Blatt

To be successful in the Global War on Terrorism, United States military forces require objective, verifiable and reliable information for making decisions and planning operations. With divergent ideas among national-security decision-makers concerning how and where the GWOT should be waged, military forces must be able to demonstrate to those decision-makers the impact the forces have in the area of operations. This article offers one instrument that, correctly implemented, could be used by operators to assess the situation on the ground, measure their impact and report the “ground truth” to higher headquarters.

The measures of effectiveness area-assessment tool, or MOEAAT, is an instrument that commanders can use to analyze relevant, real-time information gleaned from their operators. The MOEAAT is an adaptation of the tool proposed by Charles W. Elliot in his article, “Quantitative Analysis in Haiti: Allocation of SOF Assets,” published in the Winter 1997 issue of *Special Warfare*. The MOEAAT was used successfully in support of Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1995 by Special Operations Task Force-Haiti, or SOTF-Haiti (2nd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group), under the command of then-Lieutenant Colonel David Fridovich, and by the 1st SF Group, under the command of then-Colonel Fridovich, in the Philippines during Operation Enduring Freedom.

Most recently, the MOEAAT was used by the 3rd Battalion, 3rd SF Group, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel

Samuel Lynn Ashley, which fought as Special Operations Task Force-33 during OEF IX. SOTF-33 used the MOEAAT to produce information used to develop courses of action throughout the spectrum of operations in eastern and northern Afghanistan in late 2006 and early 2007.

### FOCUS GROUP

During OEF IX, SOTF-33, at its headquarters in Bagram, united conventional combat-arms officers, interagency partners, coalition elements, civil-affairs planners, psychological-operations planners, public-affairs officers and representatives of the U.S. Agency for International Development. This conglomerated focus group, called the Effects Working Group, or EWG, analyzed the results of the MOEAAT to provide recommendations to higher headquarters for future operations and to modify the orders for ongoing operations. Sharing insights stemming from their different perspectives, members of the EWG analyzed the data and provided suggestions about the tactical, operational and strategic applications that could be taken from the results of the MOEAAT.

The EWG’s objective was to examine the periodic reports from the MOEAAT (every 60 to 90 days) and provide the detailed, objective, long-term feedback essential to ensuring that the SOTF’s efforts were focused not only on doing things right but also on doing the right things. The EWG analyzed the data, identified trends and discussed the analysis provided by the MOEAAT.

Column A	Column B	Column C	Column D	Column E
Questions/BOS: FS	Indicators	Yes/No	Rating 0-5 (high)	Observations/comments Specify which ANSF when making comments, and give numbers of ANSF personnel.
Does each element have functional fire-support systems?	a. Bases have functional mortars. b. Units have functional RPGs. c. There is adequate ammo for all systems.	No	1	
Do fire-support systems have all subcomponents?	a. Mortars have bipods. b. Mortars have base plates. c. Mortars have sights.	No	1	
Does ANF have ammunition for fire-support systems?	a. RPGs have rounds and fuses. b. Mortars have all types of rounds. c. Units have enough rounds for operations and training.	No	1	
Are soldiers trained on fire-support systems?	a. Crews maintain unit integrity. b. Crews train monthly. c. Crews rotate between positions during training.	Yes	4	
Is there a system in place to maintain the fire-support systems?	a. Tubes are cleaned on a regular basis. b. Sights are function-tested on a regular basis. c. Tubes are covered when not in use.	Yes	3	

^ **ASSESSMENT TOOL** The measures of effectiveness area-assessment tool, or MOEAAT, allows Soldiers on the ground to assess area conditions and the impact of the forces on the ground, in order to relay ground truth to higher headquarters. The partial assessment shown here deals with the fire-support capabilities of Afghan National Forces, as observed by U.S. Special Forces Soldiers.

The EWG gave SOTF-33 access to a far greater level of subject-matter expertise than it possessed on its own. By using standardized OEF communications networks, advanced operations bases, or AOBs, and SF detachments on the ground were able to interact with the experts in the EWG. The resulting network fostered creative solutions and helped ensure that future operations would coordinate tactical actions with operational and strategic goals. The EWG ensured that SOTF-33's initiatives focused on long-term ob-

jectives and synchronized with the operations and plans of Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan and the combined joint task force.

For example, when the EWG used the MOEAAT to examine and analyze data from the first two iterations of OEF, it noted that the Afghan National Security Forces, or ANSF, needed to improve their ability to conduct information operations, or IO. Moreover, the analysis from the field stated that an increase in IO capability would greatly increase the



ANSF's ability to win the hearts and minds of the populace. Identifying that need led to the creation of SOTF-33's winter IO campaign, "Operation Lighthouse." Operation Lighthouse provided a viable means of increasing the ANSF's ability to produce its message and disseminate it to the Afghan populace. Previous IO efforts by coalition forces had produced an abundance of hand-cranked radios throughout even the remote areas of eastern and northern Afghanistan. The problem lay in the lack of radio stations that possessed the broadcast range to reach the populace and in the lack of communicators who possessed the credibility and charisma needed to influence the population.

The first phase of Operation Lighthouse involved working with radio stations to increase the coverage area. That work resulted in a large increase in broadcast area for a small investment. The second phase of Operation Lighthouse addressed developing the "human capital" of the ANSF IO machine. It entailed identifying, working with, and in many cases, training key Afghan communicators for the ANSF. Operation Lighthouse was facilitated by the SOTF leveraging the various feedback mechanisms (including the MOEAAT) available for assessing the effectiveness of the ongoing ANSF IO effort. Those feedback mechanisms enabled SOTF-33 to provide useful and responsive feedback.

In an operational environment that offers numerous possible courses of action, military and civilian leaders require valid, reliable and objective data in order to make informed decisions concerning military operations and the allocation of resources. It is essential to capture data that portray upward and downward trends, and to provide a detailed analysis that explains the trends.

The MOEAAT was originally written for counterinsurgency operations. Extremely flexible, it can be adapted to most areas in which special-operations forces operate. In Afghanistan, the MOEAAT was adapted to cover six categories: The Afghan National Security Forces (Afghan army, police, etc.); the Afghanistan government; the quality of life of the populace; the infrastructure; the insurgency; and the coalition forces.

Each category of the MOEAAT has from five to 15 measures, listed in Column A. Each of these measures has a number of subquestions, listed in Column B, designed to clarify the operational definition for the operator and to increase the validity of the measures. Column C is the yes/no answer to the main question posed in Column A. The rating in Column D requires the operator to make a quantitative analysis, with 0 representing a "no" answer and 5 representing a "yes." Numbers 0-5 indicate the level of agreement. Column E is open-ended and requires the operator to make observations and comments that support the answers in columns C and D.

## STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

The MOEAAT's strengths are numerous. First, it can assess items that indicate success or failure in non-Western societies. For example, when operators examined the infrastructure in Afghanistan, items included "availability of potable water" and "adequate road systems to get goods to market."

It is imperative that data-collection tools assess information relevant to the area of operations. Unfortunately, many of the tools currently used by the U.S. military are efficient only at evaluating military, governmental and civilian organizations very similar to our own. Many people in the Third World are living in underdeveloped or developing areas whose standards are different from those of the U.S. It is unrealistic to expect valid and reliable data from an instrument that is not written for the Third World.

We also require a tool that yields data that can be analyzed scientifically. Policy-makers and analysts in the government, academia and think-tanks need data they can use to understand the influence and effect of military operations on the ground. While anecdotal information is interesting, and a commander's assessment can be helpful, neither is a good basis for policy decisions.

A second strength of the MOEAAT is the extensive scope and level of detail it yields. Most of the assessment tools that SF now use employ either a qualitative measure that cannot easily be quantified or a quantitative measure that lacks explanatory detail. The MOEAAT has three columns in which operators report their assessments: The first (C) is a simple yes/no answer. The second (D) allows operators to elaborate on their level of agreement with the yes/no answer. The third (E) requires the operator's detailed observations and comments. These qualitative assessments broaden the scope of the information and decision-makers' ability to understand what is occurring on the ground.

A third strength of the MOEAAT is that the indicators or prompts in Column B help remind operators what the main question is intended to measure, minimizing individual interpretation and increasing the data's validity and reliability.

Standardized use of the MOEAAT would also allow policy-makers to analyze data three ways: for a single location over time, for two or more locations at a single point in time, or for two or more locations over time. The current lack of uniformity in data-collection within SF battalions and groups limits the prospects for analysis. A standard data-collection and measurement tool, such as the MOEAAT, would allow SF to collect similar types of data and to report trends that could then be compared across a region and across time. For example, we could track progress or setbacks related to weather; to changes in provincial or district leadership; to enemy activity in the region; to

access to funds of the Commander's Emergency Response Program; to initiatives in the region by nongovernment organizations or by the U.S. Agency for International Development; or to the rotation of troops. Because the MOEAAT offers a standardized assessment, it allows us make comparisons without fear of comparing "apples to oranges."

Finally, the MOEAAT is adaptable. It provides a template that can be revised for different locations and for changes in the operating environment. The format presented here has been modified for a number of environments, including Haiti (during Operation Uphold Democracy) and the Philippines (during Operation Enduring Freedom). During OEF IX, as seen in our example, the MOEAAT was modified to allow operators to measure the ANSF by battlefield operating system.

One suggestion is that units use the MOEAAT as written but allow commanders to add questions as addenda. The benefits of this method are twofold: First, the commander's questions can help clarify unique situations. Second, adding questions as addenda allows the statistical analysis to be run either with all questions or with only those in the main body of the MOEAAT. That allows for comparison with other regions and within the same region over time (before the extra questions were added). It is important to remember that significant revisions to the main body of the MOEAAT affect its ability to track changes over time.

It is imperative that some sort of periodic review be done at a higher level, with input from the SF groups, and necessary revisions made to ensure the relevancy and validity of the MOEAAT. While revisions carry the potential of destroying the ability to compare data over time, that possibility is outweighed by the need for valid and reliable data.

Certainly, the MOEAAT has limitations. Without proper training on its administration or proper motivation to complete it as intended, operators may produce data that are suspect. It is reasonable to allocate 30 to 45 days of operations in a particular area before operators can provide reliable and valid data. Currently, many operators do not understand the value of collecting the data, and they see it as busy work. Some operators report that rather than documenting data on a regular basis, they attempt to recall all the details the night before they give the assessment to their chain of command. Some others give only superficial information to support their assessments.

Failure to appreciate the value of data can also cause problems. If operators do not understand how to use the tool correctly, they cannot maximize its utility. The culture of operators is such that data assessments are not considered to be as important as lethal and nonlethal engagements, building relationships with indigenous and coalition partners, and other more conventional SF roles. Commands must teach their operators the importance of collecting reliable and valid data. The best-developed tools will be time-consuming for the operators to complete, but if the operators believe that their assessments are as influential as their more traditional responsibilities, they will devote more time to presenting decision-makers with good data.

Operators are rarely, if ever, properly trained to use the instruments they are given for data collection. To minimize confusion, team leaders, company commanders and battalion staffs should receive predeployment training on the implementation and importance of the tool. While a well-developed instrument should be free of obscurity, the reality is that the wording of questions can be confusing. If the SOTF provided clear and concise instruction on the use of the tool, it could eliminate many potential problems.

## CONCLUSION

Colin Powell notes that during the Vietnam War, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's detached policies and directives generated strange, irrelevant indices of success. For example, Powell says, a village was rated as "secure" when it had a certain number of feet of fence around it and it had not had a village chief killed by the Viet Cong during the previous three weeks. When Secretary McNamara announced that every quantitative measurement showed that the U.S. was winning the war, Powell and many others in the trenches were astounded at the illusionary thinking.<sup>1</sup>

Dramatically different from meaningless metrics such as McNamara's, the MOEAAT is a valuable instrument for ARSOF's ongoing engagement in the GWOT. It can provide decision-makers with a unique perspective on challenges and opportunities in the area of operations and can give them realistic measures of the effectiveness of ongoing operations.

The key is for leaders to train their subordinates to use the MOEAAT. Moreover, it is essential that the command keep the MOEAAT relevant by periodically adding questions as addenda that address concerns relevant to an area and to local operations.

SF forces are in a unique position not only to make a tremendous tactical impact but also to provide data from the field to our operational and strategic decision-makers. This is an exciting and essential, if often overlooked, aspect of the SF mission, and using the MOEAAT is an excellent way of completing it. **SW**

Notes:

<sup>1</sup>Oren Harari, *The Leadership Secrets of Colin Powell* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 183-84.

**Major Darin J. Blatt** is commander of Company B, 3rd Battalion, 3rd SF Group. He recently served as the operations officer for Special Operations Task Force-33 during Operation Enduring Freedom IX. His previous assignments include infantry platoon leader, 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division; commander, SF detachment 335, assistant operations officer and commander of Headquarters Support Company in the 1st Battalion, 3rd SF Group. Major Blatt has also served at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School as a small-group instructor for Phase III of the SF Qualification Course. He holds a bachelor's degree in military history from the U.S. Military Academy and a master's degree in national security and strategic studies from the Naval War College, Newport, R.I.



## Officer

### New system grants credit for wider range of joint duty

The new Joint Qualification System gives officers an opportunity to count education and experience in joint-duty assignments that are not on the Joint Duty Assignment List toward qualification for the designation of joint-qualified officer, or JQO.

To be eligible for the designation, officers must be majors or above and must have completed the first and second phases of Joint Professional Military Education, or JPME. JPME consists of rigorous and thorough system instruction and examinations of military officers that are designed to promote an in-depth understanding of theoretical and practical matters of joint service. It is organized into three phases:

Phase I, or JPME I, is incorporated into the curricula of intermediate and military-service schools and other educational programs that meet JPME criteria. Intermediate Level Education satisfies the JPME I requirement.

Phase II, JPME II, is embedded

in the curricula of the following resident courses, and their graduates qualify for JPME II credit:

- National War College senior service college.
- Industrial College of the Armed Forces senior service college.
- Joint Advanced Warfighting School (senior service college or ILE version).
- Joint and Combined Warfighting School, Marine Corps War College (beginning with the class of June 2006).
- Air Force War College (beginning with the class of June 2007).
- College of Naval Warfare (beginning with the class of 2006, which attended the Joint Military Operations Course).
- Army War College (beginning with the class of 2007).

Phase III, or Capstone, is mandated by federal law and is designed to prepare new general and flag officers to work with members of the other armed forces.

Officers may nominate their joint experience as being creditable for experience points. The Joint Staff will form a board of general and flag officers to review the provided documentation to determine whether the experience meets the "joint matters" requirement. Beginning Oct. 1, 2010, officers will have one year from the completion date of a joint experience to nominate it.

However, from Oct. 1, 2007, to Sept. 30, 2010, officers may retroactively nominate their joint experiences accrued during specific periods. For active-Army officers, the period is Sept. 11, 2001, to Oct. 1, 2007; for Army Reserve and National Guard officers, the period is Oct. 1, 1986, to Oct. 1, 2007.

For more information regarding joint education and experience, visit the Web site of the Army Human Resources Command's Joint Policy Branch at <https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/protect/Active/opdistjp/index.htm>.

## Warrant Officer

### SF WOs must attend SFWOAC before promotion to CWO 4

With recent changes to DA PAM 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, warrant officers must now attend the SF Warrant Officer Advanced Course before they can be promoted to CWO 4. Recent graduates of the SFWOAC should ensure that their graduation is reflected in their records.

With the scheduled implementation of the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System, or DIMHRS, March 1, 2009, accuracy of records is especially important. SF warrant officers and all other Soldiers should have a good knowledge of what should be in their records

prior to the change and should verify the accuracy and completeness of their records several months prior to DIMHRS implementation.

### ARNG CWO 2s may now attend WOAC

Because of changes to the Army National Guard promotion policy, ARNG SF CWO 2s may now attend the SF Warrant Officer Advanced Course with only two years' time in grade. Prospective students must have a final top-secret security clearance before they come to the course.

### West Virginia ARNG 180As win distinction

Special Forces warrant officers in the West Virginia Army National Guard

recently achieved a 100-percent duty-MOS qualification rating. West Virginia, home to the headquarters of the 2nd Battalion, 19th SF Group, and Company C of the 2/19th SF Group, is also the first state to fill its SF warrant-officer positions according to the modified table of organization and equipment that becomes effective in September 2008.

### States attain ARNG SF WO recruiting goals

As of March 17, the following states are nearing or exceeding their 2008 goals for accessing ARNG SF warrant officers: Mississippi (150 percent); Illinois (100 percent); West Virginia (100 percent); Alabama (75 percent); Utah (67 percent); and Washington (50 percent).

# Enlisted

## ARSOF MOSs achieve best-ever SFC promotion rates

Congratulations to all Soldiers in Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations who were selected by the fiscal year 2008 sergeant first class promotion-selection board. The 2008 selection rates are the best yet for ARSOF. CA had 74 Soldiers considered and 73 selected, for a 99-percent selection rate. SF had 536 Soldiers considered and 524 selected, for a 98-percent selection rate. PO had 54 Soldiers considered and 51 selected, for a 94-percent selection rate. These high promotion rates will help the force attain the approved growth in force structure.

## CA accession board selects 42

The Civil Affairs Accessions Board conducted in February selected 42 Soldiers. The Special Operations Recruiting Battalion is taking application packets for the next CA Accessions Board, scheduled for June. Interested Soldiers should contact SFC Herring or SFC Pease at (910) 907-9697. The accessions board looks for Soldiers who meet the prerequisites listed in DA Pam 611-21, Military Occupational Classification and Structure, Chapter 10. Soldiers can view

the prerequisites online at: <https://perscomnd04.army.mil/MOSMARTBK.nsf/>.

## Army shifts approach to training, promoting SGMs

The fiscal year 2008 Command Sergeant Major/Sergeant Major/Sergeants Major Course Selection Board will be conducted June 3-24. With the announcement of the board, the Army has changed the way that it will select and train future sergeants major.

The change is a shift from the former policy of train-select-promote to one of select-train-promote. It eliminates the selection of alternates to attend the Sergeants Major Course, or SMC, at the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy.

Beginning with the FY 2008 selection board, NCOs selected for the SMC will also be selected for promotion after they complete the course. The transition requires that the FY 2008 selection board results be released in two lists: promotion and training.

The promotion list will announce those master sergeants targeted for promotion up through the SMC graduation in May 2010. All earlier SMC graduates and alternates for the SMC class graduating in 2009 who are selected by the FY 2008 board should appear on the list. Any mas-

ter sergeant appearing on the list who is not an SMC graduate or student will have to complete the nonresident SMC.

The training list will show those master sergeants selected to attend the SMC class that begins in August 2009. They will attend SMC as master sergeants and be targeted for promotion between their graduation in May 2010 and May 2011. They will be frocked to sergeant major at graduation and will be managed and assigned as sergeants major.

The change in policy does not affect preparation for the board: Eligible Soldiers should still update their records and photos as required and ensure that they validate their promotion files online.

## E8 selection board to convene in August

The 2009 Master Sergeant Promotion-Selection Board will meet Aug. 5-28 rather than in October. The change was necessary because fielding of the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System, now set for March 1, 2009, was originally scheduled for Oct. 1.

For additional information, telephone Sergeant Major Jeff Bare at DSN 239-7594, commercial (910) 432-7594, or send e-mail to: [barej@soc.mil](mailto:barej@soc.mil).

## WE WANT TO HEAR FROM YOU...

The Special Warfare staff needs your help to make this the best publication it can be. Drop us a line and let us know your ideas and opinions about the concept and design of the magazine.

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# WARS OF BLOOD AND FAITH: THE CONFLICTS THAT WILL SHAPE THE 21ST CENTURY

Ralph Peters is notorious for his unbiased, “hard-hitting” approach toward the world’s conflicts and strategic players. His latest book, *Wars of Blood and Faith: The Conflicts that Will Shape the Twenty-First Century*, is a compilation of his writings about tumultuous issues and conflicts around the globe, published in various media throughout 2006 and 2007.

The articles in *Wars of Blood and Faith* contain predictions and analyses about global-security issues that will affect America and the West. In addition to addressing political and military issues in Iraq and Afghanistan, Peters explores issues that involve China, Nigeria, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Venezuela, Somalia and Darfur. He provides an in-depth and meticulous dissection of these countries’ current and future impact on global stability. Throughout the book, with the articulation and forethought of a journalist, Peters discusses several common factors that pertain to the global strategic environment.

Peters’ opinion on globalization is at odds with the popular notion that globalization will lead to world stability. He states that globalization, rather than bringing humanity together, instead serves as a socially dividing force. Although globalization does unite the wealthiest citizens of the world, it causes the masses to lose their national identities and to identify instead with smaller religious and tribal sects. Peters argues that the Internet, which is generally considered to be a key tool in globalization, is also the tool of choice for spreading hatred globally.


According to Peters, the age of ideology, which was defined by savagery (e.g., Nazism, Maoism, Marxism-Leninism, the Cultural Revolution, the killing fields of Cambodia, etc.) is over. Society has returned to historical conflicts of blood and belief instigated on the basis of faith and tribe. With wars being fought over religion and ethnic identity, Peters says, statecraft, military affairs and diplomacy will have to adjust dramatically toward a new orientation.

In Peters’ opinion, the post-colonial age has begun. In this age, he predicts, arbitrary and unnatural national borders created by Europeans without regard for geography or cultural identities will collapse, and the instability will be overwhelming, from West Africa through the Middle East to Southeast Asia.

Peters also sees the role of women in Third World countries as a defining issue that will have strategic implications. According to Peters, abhorrence of the prospect of equal rights for women is a driving force behind the rage of traditional Islamists. Traditional Islamist societies fear that Western powers will emancipate Islamic women, leading to a breakdown of religiously dominated traditions, customs and governance.

According to Peters, bloodless wars are not possible. In wars of blood and faith, persuading the enemy to surrender through the use of surgical strikes, precision weapons and graduated responses is not plausible. Whether fighting states or insurgents, the military must be willing to fight hard, with the use of maximum force, or it will fail.

Peters states that the U.S. can defeat any enemy on our own terms,



## DETAILS

### By Ralph Peters

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### Reviewed by:

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but the influence of politicians, academic circles and the media degrades U.S. capabilities when firm military action is needed. Instead of deploying an overwhelming force, Peters contends, the U.S. sends a sub-par and constrained army. He believes that the media should be treated as an additional combatant in any conflict.

A journalist-warrior-philosopher, Ralph Peters challenges traditional thought and encourages individuals to think for themselves. *Wars of Blood and Faith: The Conflicts that Will Shape the Twenty-First Century* is highly recommended for individuals who seek to grasp underlying truths of the all-encompassing conflicts that will shape the world. **SW**



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